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The Infamous China Ghost City Of Ordos |
Occasionally the world has witnessed an unusual alignment of interest that usher in a strong period of growth for a country that is not easily replicated. Years ago Gordon Chang, author of "The
Coming Collapse of China," said China may only be growing 2 or 3
percent and if you strip out all the construction going into ghost
cities and
"high-speed rail lines to nowhere," the economy may not be growing at
all. At the time China claimed it had a 7.7 percent growth for the first quarter, Chang clarified his view by adding "But when you look at electricity, by far the most reliable
economic indicator of Chinese economic activity, that grew 2.9 percent
in Q1. When you consider that the growth of GDP is historically 85
percent of the growth of electricity, you're talking 2.5 percent
(growth)." Again recently short seller Jim Chanos said about China, "It’s worse than you think. Whatever you might think, it’s worse,"
It is becoming clear that China is in a situation similar to what America faced in 1929 following a period of rapid growth and credit expansion. To say the economy of China is shaky understates the situation. The type of growth we have witnessed in China during the last several decades has been extraordinary and was driven by several "one time factors" that have played out. It is important to understand many of the loans used to finance the
construction of ghost cities, unused airports, idle train lines, and other failed endeavors may never get
repaid. Instead, banks continue to roll over these loans time after time. It should also be noted that many of these loans have been made to
state-owned companies and local governments. It has become abundantly clear that China’s credit quality started to deteriorate in late 2011 as
borrowers took on more debt to serve their obligations amid a slowing
economy and weaker income.
This has caused a rapid rise in the ratio of credit to gross
domestic product. That measure has moved from 120% in 2007 to around
180% at the end of 2012. Such a sharp shift raises concerns about the misallocation of credit on a grand scale, and a build-up of bad assets
in the banking sector. Interest owed by borrowers rose to an
estimated 12.5 percent of China’s economy from 7 percent in 2008, Fitch
Ratings estimated in September. By the end of 2017, it may climb to as
much as 22 percent and “ultimately overwhelm borrowers.” Meanwhile,
China’s total credit will be pushed to almost 250 percent of gross
domestic product by then, more than double the 120 percent figure of 2007. An estimate by the Goldman Sachs Group Inc indicated the nation might face credit losses as
much as $3 trillion as defaults ensue from the expansion of the past
four years, particularly by non-bank lenders, this far exceeds amounts seen in prior credit crises.
This is not just about writing off a few bad loans.
Many strong and strange currents run through the Chinese financial
system, these include, but are not limited to things like an artificial
housing market propelled along by a lack of sound investment options and
a massive shadow banking system driven by the low interest on savings offered by state controlled banks.
It is pure insanity and a bit naive
to think that China's economic system developed over only a few decades both
anchored, helped along, built, and mentored by Americas too big to fail banks is ready for prime-time. Instead what is
before them is a sea of bad debt fueled by political corruption and a major
stimulus response following the 2008 meltdown that has misallocated funds and created massive
overcapacity.
Remember four big state-owned commercial banks and other, mainly state-controlled
banks, account for the bulk of all official lending in China and their customers tend to
be state-owned firms, other borrowers are forced to go elsewhere.
No one really
knows how big the
largely unregulated informal lending is, but it has grown
rapidly in China during the last five years. Companies and local governments who cannot
get loans from state-controlled banks have been on a borrowing binge
from these unofficial sources.
Shadow bank loans can come across to Americans as some kind of "loan shark" operation because they charge as much as 24-30% in interest and can be for
as short a period of time as just three to five days if someone is desperate for cash.
The shadow banking
sector is so large that concerns exist about contagion and a domino series of defaults that might rack the economy if savers
who have put their saving into it lose money. One of China's most
notorious shadow bankers is currently in jail serving a life sentence but this
does not help those who loaned this person money because of the high
rates he paid. The "investors" become victims and often lose everything
they have saved to
retire on when a shadow bank goes bust.
China’s biggest banks have taken a big hit and have tripled the amount of
bad loans they wrote off in the first half of this year cleaning up
their books ahead of what appears may be a fresh wave of defaults. Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd.
and its four largest competitors expunged 22.1 billion yuan of debt
that couldn’t be collected through June, up from 7.65 billion yuan a
year earlier. “In the next three to four
years, industries with excess capacity will be the main source of
credit loss for banks and their nonperforming loans as China cleans up
the legacy,” said Liao Qiang,
a Beijing-based director at Standard & Poor’s. “The speed of the
process will depend on the government’s determination and whether they
are willing to incur short-term pain for long-term gain.”
Policy makers in
Beijing have said they would elevate the role of markets in the
nation’s economy and China’s top banking regulator has urged lenders to “seek
channels to clean up bad loans by industries with overcapacity to
prevent new risks from brewing” and deal with the issue. Overcapacity is a big problem, a third of the country’s 1,600 shipyards may shut down within five years
amid a global vessel glut, said the secretary general of the China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry, said in July. Ji Fenghua, chairman of Nantong Mingde Heavy Industry Group Co., another struggling “Shipping Valley” thinks this is an an understatement, he said “I
won’t be surprised if half of the shipbuilders fail, given the excess
capacity,” In July 2012 hundreds of his
workers who hadn’t been paid in three months besieged his office
building.
Many capital-and-labor-intensive industries that have relied on
bank loans and policy support for their past success are now in deep trouble. Support for the solar industry since late 2008
has resulted in at least one factory producing sun-powered products in
half of China’s 600 cities, according to the China Renewable Energy
Society in Beijing. China Development Bank, the world’s largest policy
lender, alone lent more than 50 billion yuan to solar-panel makers as of
August 2012, data from the China Banking Association showed. China
accounts for seven of every 10 solar panels produced worldwide. If they
ran at full speed, the factories could produce 10 times more than in 2008, according to data compiled by
Bloomberg. This overcapacity has driven down prices to about 84 cents a
watt, compared with $2 at the end of 2010, but falling prices have forced dozens of
producers into bankruptcy. One local bank now reports a 33 percent nonperforming-loan ratio
for the solar-panel industry, compared with 2 percent at the beginning
of the year.
The
real situation is much worse than the data shows because it will
take at least a year or longer for many of the non-preforming loans to be recognized by the banks. This overcapacity is seen in other industries such as steel and cement, which are also facing a serious glut. China’s economic
planners have sought to rein in the steel industry since at least 2004,
when work on a 10.6 billion yuan project in Jiangsu was halted. Even so,
the
steel association shows annual capacity has risen to 970 million metric tons. China now produces seven times more than No. 2 Japan. About 10
million tons of aluminum production capacity is being built at a time
when the industry incurred combined losses of 670 million yuan in the
first half, with some producers in central and eastern China facing
severe losses.
Because of this more than 1,400
companies in 19 industries including steel, and cement have been told to
cut excess production capacity this year. This is an indication that the
government is serious in pursuing pledges to fix fundamental issues in the economy, but as they move in this direction the financial pain will be brutal. China’s
lending spree has created a debt burden similar in magnitude to the one
that pushed Asian nations into crisis in the late 1990s. As companies loaded up on debt, the efficiency of
credit use has deteriorated. Since 2009, for every yuan of credit
issued, China’s GDP grew by an average 0.4 yuan, while the pre-2009
average was 0.8 yuan. This means printing and loaning more money has not resulted in the same amount of growth that it did in the past. It is now becoming clear the 2008 stimulus was not the correct answer to move China forward, but instead it only exacerbated an industrial glut that has been in
existence since 2003.
To those who doubt just how massive the problems are they only need look to the newly constructed city of Ordos in Inner Mongolia. Most of the new town buildings are empty or unfinished. Ordos is a spectacular example of a new Chinese phenomenon, that now exist in many cities,
unsold condos, unleased shops, and building after building of empty
office space.
In
March of 2012 the BBC ran a story about the city of Ordos, that
suggested the great Chinese building boom, which did so much to fuel the
country's astonishing economic growth was coming to an end and was a
bubble about to burst. This ghost city is by most accounts devoid of people and construction of the half finished project is at a halt. Western financial experts who fear a bursting of the Chinese real
estate bubble point out that the Chinese economy still remains more dependent on
home building than the United States economy was, before the sub-prime
lending bubble burst in 2007.
Footnote; Please feel free to explore the blog archives and as always
you comments are encouraged. For more on China see any of the post
below,
http://brucewilds.blogspot.com/2014/03/china-and-great-credit-trap.html
http://brucewilds.blogspot.com/2013/11/china-land-of-overcapacity-and-debt.html
http://brucewilds.blogspot.com/2013/04/china-and-corruption.html
http://brucewilds.blogspot.com/2013/02/china-bubble-yes-it-is.html
http://brucewilds.blogspot.com/2012/09/china-made-by-america.html